Game Theory Seminar

11:30-12:30 Bayesian Persuasion in Networks: Divisibility and Network Irrelevance

• Yevgeny Tsodikovich
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 Magical Implementation

• Ariel Rubinstein
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 Collaborative Writing through Voting, Recommendation, and Coalition Building

• Nimrod Talmon
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 Blackwell’s Approachability with Approximation Algorithms

• Garber, Dan
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 Stable Marriage: Loyalty vs. Competition

• Alon Ede
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 An Epistemic Model with Boundedly-Rational Players

• Mikhail Panov
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 “Calibeating”: Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game

• Sergiu Hart
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 Share-Based Fairness for Arbitrary Entitlements

• Moshe Babaioff
• Bloomfield 527

11:30-12:30 A bidding game for allocation of indivisible goods

• Uriel Feige
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 Aligning Machine Learning with Society

• Lee Cohen
• Bloomfield, 424

11:30-12:30 Revealed Preference Tests for Bayesian Persuasion

• Jeffrey Mensch
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 The edge-averaging process on graphs with random initial opinions

• Ron Peretz
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 Motivated Misspecification

• Mingzi Niu
• Bloomfield 424

11:30-12:30 Comparison of Oracles

• David Lagziel
• Bloomfield 424