Group decisions in stochastic environments: Which rules and strategies benefit whom?

Wed 09.12 11:30 - 12:30

Abstract: How should a society choose its voting rule when proposals arise from an uncertain environment? Is simple majority a good choice? When does cooperation benefit individual agents, and when is it preferable to act independently? How do voting rules influence the formation, growth, and dissolution of groups? We address these questions within the Voting in Stochastic Environment (ViSE) model. Proposals arise exogenously and produce random gains or losses for the agents, who vote on their acceptance or rejection. Agents may vote according to their individual interests or coordinate their votes within groups. The resulting expected gains depend on the stochastic environment, voting rules, and social structure. We compare the benefits of different decision rules and voting strategies, identify situations in which seemingly reasonable choices become disadvantageous, and establish several general regularities. We also examine how individual incentives to join or leave groups, together with changes in voting thresholds, can generate distinct patterns of social evolution, including stable configurations and cycles. The talk combines analytical results with numerical illustrations for neutral, favorable, and unfavorable environments.

Speaker

Pavel Chebotarev

Technion