Unfair Justice: Will Bigger Punishment Decrease Enforcement Frequency?

ABSTRACT Traditional deterrence theory assumes that punishment severity and enforcement frequency operate as independent factors in preventing illegal behavior. However, recent evidence suggests these factors may interact: when enforcers perceive punishments as excessively severe, their willingness to impose them may decline. This creates a counterintuitive problem where policies designed to strengthen deterrence through harsher punishments might actually weaken it by reducing enforcement rates. The current research examines how fine severity affects enforcement behavior through two within-subjects experiments. Participants served as enforcers monitoring rule violations and deciding whether to punish or warn violators under two fine conditions: small (-11 points) versus large (-99 points). Experiment 1 employed a controlled design with computer-controlled violators to isolate enforcer behavior across 60 rounds. Experiment 2 extended these findings to a dynamic multiplayer environment with human participants in both enforcer and violator roles. Results consistently demonstrated that enforcers punished significantly less frequently when fines were large compared to small. These findings challenge the independence assumption in deterrence theory, suggesting that excessively severe punishments can undermine enforcement effectiveness by creating reluctance among those responsible for imposing them.